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Appellant Barbara R. Krambule, by and through counsel Jay D. Edmonds and
Paige Williamson, and pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 49 submits the
following petition for writ of certiorari in this matter.

QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW
L

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Appellant's claim for
child support for her minor son is barred by res judicata,

II,

Whether the Court of Appeals abused its discretion in holding the trial court
erred in finding there was a substantial change in circumstances and therefore
had no basis on which to modify the divorce decree.

IIL

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to consider the best interests of
the child for whom support is sought

COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
The court of Appeals opinion in this case is found at Krambule v. Krambule, No.
981567-CA(UtahApp. 1999).

STATEMENT OF SUPREME COURT JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision July 9, 1998 dismissing
Respondent's appeal of partial summary judgment. (R.410) The Court of Appeals

1

decision in this matter was entered on December 9, 1999. The Supreme Court has
jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (3).

CONTROLLING PROVISIONS
(1) Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5:
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the custody of the children and their support, maintenance,
health, and dental care, and for distribution of the property and obligations
for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(2) Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-6
Time of trial. If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during
the pregnancy of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the
alleged father, be held until after the birth or miscarriage but during such
delay testimony may be perpetuated according to the laws of this state.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married on the 31st day of March, 1979. The Petitioner gave birth
to two children, Stephanie Krambule, born on January 20, 1985 and Matthew Krambule,
born on March 24, 1992. The parties entered into a stipulation and property settlement
agreement on the 16th day of January, 1992. (R. 27) See Appendix 3 The Respondent
appeared in court on the 10th day of February, 1992 and presented testimony concerning
2

jurisdiction and grounds and introduced the stipulation and agreement. (R. 39) The
divorce decree was signed by the judge on the 3rd day of April, 1992 and entered with the
clerk of the court on the 6th day of April, 1992. (R. 43) The Petitioner filed a verified
petition on July 15, 1996 in which the Petitioner requested the court to make a
determination as to the Respondent's responsibility for the minor child Matthew
Krambule. (R. 50)
The trial court invited the parties to submit motions for summary judgment on the
paternity issue. (R. 218) The motions were heard on the 21st day of January, 1998 and
the judge issued a bench ruling. (R. 264) Thefindingsof fact, conclusions of law and
an order on motion for summary judgment were signed by the judge on March 24, 1998
and filed with the clerk of the court on March 27, 1998. (R. 326, 331) See Appendix 2.
An evidentiary hearing concerning thefinancialaspects of the court's ruling was held on
the 30th day of April, 1998. (R. 379) This hearing resulted infindingsof fact,
conclusions of law and a modified divorce decree, which were entered with the clerk of
the court on the 9th day of July, 1998. (R. 395, 405) See Appendix 2. The Respondent
filed an appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals on or about the 8th day of September, 1998.
The Court of Appeals rendered it's opinion reversing the trial court on December 9, 1999.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The parties were married on March 31, 1979. The parties had two children,
Stephanie, born January 29, 1985, and Matthew, born March 24, 1992. Both children
3

were conceived through artificial insemination. The facts surrounding the second child
are at issue in this case. The parties have separated twice since their marriage, once in
late 1989 and again on or about May 2, 1991. (Deposition of Barbara R. Krambule,
hereinafter Krambule depo., pp 9-11) (R. 485).

On or about July 18, 1990, the parties

agreed to again use artificial insemination to conceive a child. On that date the parties
signed an agreement entitled "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy
through Artificial Insemination of Donor Sperm". See Appendix 3. Beginning in
August, 1990, and continuing thereafter until January 1991, Petitioner underwent various
medical procedures to prepare for the artificial insemination process which included two
surgical procedures and the administration of medication to prevent her from
menstruating. In approximately February, 1991, Petitioner and Respondent picked three
potential sperm donors attempting to choose a donor with the same features as the
Respondent. (Krambule depo., pp. 14-16). Beginning in February, 1991, and continuing
thereafter until Petitioner conceived, she began undergoing blood tests, taking fertility
drugs, having ultrasounds and undergoing the insemination process. (Krambule depo.,
pp. 17-18).
The parties separated on approximately May 3, 1991 and Petitioner conceived on
or about June 23, 1991, approximately one month after the parties separated. (Krambule
depo., pp. 18). During the month after separation the Petitioner continued with the
process because she believed that they would work things out as they had before in the
previous separation. (Krambule depo., p 21). In fact, during the Summer of 1991, the
4

parties continued seeing each other socially. (Krambule depo., p47). After separating,
Respondent wrote a letter to the Petitioner which she received at the end of May, 1991 in
an attempt to reconcile with the Petitioner. (Krambule depo.,pp40-41). See Appendix 3
A copy of this letter and its typewritten equivalent was included as Deposition Exhibit 3
to the Petitioner's deposition.

The letter, after discussing the financial ramifications of

divorce, states "And if you get pregnant I've got no idea how that's going to work." This
letter admits that the Respondent knew Barbara Krambule was continuing the artificial
insemination procedure and could still get pregnant. (Krambule depo., p43).
Three months after conception, in approximately September, 1991, Respondent
initiated divorce proceedings. (R. 1) In approximately November or December 1991, the
Respondent's counsel prepared a stipulation and property settlement agreement. (R. 1)
On December 3, 1991, Petitioner's attorney sent a letter to Respondent's attorney stating
that the Petitioner wished to pursue child support for the child with which she was
pregnant. (R. 84) See appendix 3.
Prior to the preparation and execution of the stipulation and agreement, the
Petitioner was admitted to St. Benedict's Hospital for emotional and mental problems
resulting from verbal abuse, threats made by the Respondent and the impending divorce.
(Krambule depo. p 25) It was during this hospitalization that she was driven by her
father to her attorney's office to sign the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement
whereby she was then returned to St. Benedict's Hospital to continue treatment.
(Krambule depo. p26).
5

Matthew was born on March 24, 1992, and the Divorce Decree was entered on
April 6, 1992. (R. 43) Petitioner did not pursue paternity after Matthew was born
because the Respondent always promised to do what was right for Matthew in the future.
(Krambule depo p28) The Respondent continually led the Petitioner to believe that he
would assume responsibility for Matthew by telling the other minor child that he would
start visiting with her and her brother when Matthew was older. Then Respondent
wanted to wait until a child psychologist determined what was best for Matthew. When
Petitioner realized that the Respondent was never going to accept responsibility for
Matthew she initiated this proceeding.
At the request of the trial court, both parties submitted motions for summary
judgment. (R. 218) The Petitioner's motion was supported b the Petitioner's deposition,
which was published. The Respondent's motion was not supported by deposition or by
Affidavit. On January 21, 1998 a hearing on the summary judgments was held before
Judge Darwin Hansen. That hearing resulted in findings of fact, conclusions of law, and
an order on motion for summary judgment, which documents were filed with the clerk on
March 27, 1998. (R. 326, 331) See Appendix 2. After the Court's ruling on the motion
for summary judgment, an evidentiary hearing relating to the financial obligations of the
Respondent as the result of the summary judgment ruling was held before Judge Hansen
on the 30th day of April, 1998. (R. 379). Findings of fact, conclusions of law and a
modified decree of divorce were entered with the clerk of the court on July 9, 1998. (R.
395) See Appendix 2.
6

The Respondent appealed from the trial court's order on the motions for summary
judgment andfromthe evidentiary hearing held on April 30, 1998. After briefing and
argument, the Court of Appeals issued an opinion on December 9, 1999, holding (1)
Petitioner's claim for an increase in child support for Stephanie, an order theat
Respondent pay child support for Matthew and an order declaring Respondent as
Matthew's child was res judicata and (2) the trial court erred infindingthere was a
substantial change in circumstances and therefore had no basis to modify the decree of
divorce. Krambule v. Krambule, No. 981567-CA (Utah App. 1999); Appendix 1.
Petitioner now seeks review of the Court of Appeals opinion.

REASONS FOR ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR CHILD SUPPORT FOR HER MINOR
SON IS BARRED BY RES JUDICATA.
The Court of Appeals incorrectly held that res judicata barred Petitioner's claim
for the support of Matthew. "Res judicata has two branches claim preclusion and issue
preclusion." Masters v. Worslev. 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). Issue
preclusion applies when the issues have been litigated in a prior cause of action and it
requires that the issue in the prior case be fully litigated. IdL Claim preclusion prevents
relitigation of claims that have been fully litigated by the parties on the merits or claims
which could have or should have been litigated in the prior action, but were not raised.
In the present case the Court of Appeals held that claim preclusion barred the Petitioner's
7

claim for Matthew's support.
The Petitioner could not have litigated the issue of child support for Matthew in
the divorce proceeding. In order for the issue of support to be litigated in the divorce
proceeding, there would have had to have been an initial finding of paternity. Absent the
consent of the Respondent paternity could not have been litigated dining the divorce
proceedings as the child had yet to be bom. This is clearly stated in § 78-45a-6, Utah
Code Annotated "If the issue of paternity is raised in action commenced during the
pregnancy of the mother, the trial shall not, without the consent of the alleged father, be
held until after the birth or miscarriage . . .". The claim for support of Matthew was not
litigated during the divorce proceedings nor could it have been because the issue of
paternity could not be decided until Matthew was bom.
The Court of Appeals applied the doctrine of res judicata indicating that because
the birth of Matthew was foreseeable the issue of his support should have been litigated.
However, foreseeablity does not allow paternity litigation to proceed absent the
Respondent's consent.
The issue of paternity and, therefore, support for Matthew could not have been
raised during the divorce proceeding. If an issue could not have been raised, then res
judicata does not apply.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
HOLDING THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THERE WAS
A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES
8

The Court of Appeals held that since the issue of support for Matthew was res
judicata the trial court erred in finding that there had been a substantial change in
circumstances to warrant modifying the decree of divorce. The court in Stevens v.
Collard. 837 P.2d 593 (Utah 1992), stated the standard of review in determining the
sufficiency of the trial courtsfindingof changed circumstances, " a trial courts decision
concerning modification of a divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion." (Quoting Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d at 838.)

The Court of Appeals did

not apply this standard. Instead, the Court of Appeals reviewed the trial courts factual
finding of a substantial change in circumstances under a summary judgement review
standard. The standard of review for summary judgement as correctly stated by the Court
of Appeals in the present case is to review the trial court's ruling for correctness. The
Court of Appeals incorrectly applied this standard to the entire case presented when only
part of the case before them came to them on appeal from summary judgement. The trial
court invited each party to submit a motion for summary judgement on the paternity
issue. The issue of paternity, and only the issue of paternity, was decided by summary
judgment. Following the trial courts ruling on the motion for summary judgement on
March 24, 1998 the trial court held an evidentiary hearing. While the issue of paternity
was decided as question of law under summary judgement the issue of whether there is a
change in circumstance is a factual determination.
The court in Department of Human Services v. Irizarrv. 943 P.2d 676 (Utah 1997)
stated "before enumerating the facts, we address the standard of review. An appellate
9

court "will not reverse the findings of fact of a trial court sitting without a jury unless
they are 'against the clear weight of the evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erroneous.'"
(quoting MacKav v. Hardv. 896 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1995))
The trial court determined that there was a substantial change in circumstances
since the entry of the decree of divorce, namely the birth of the parties second child.

An

additional child for whom support is sought certainly is a change in circumstances which
affects the ability to provide for both children. Such a finding is not against the weight of
the evidence and should not have been reversed.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE
THE CHILD'S RIGHT TO SUPPORT,
The Court of Appeals did not consider the strong public policy concern for
paternity and the support of minor children. In reversing the trial court's decision the
Court of Appeals has left a child without the support of one of his parents. In doing so
the court has, in essence ignored the well precedented rule that child support is the right
of the child. See Gullev v. Gullev, 570 P.2d 127 (Utah 1977), Department of Human
Services v. Irizarrv. 945 P.2d 676 (Utah 1977) Huck v. HucL 734 P.2d 417 (Utah 1986)
Baggs v. Anderson. 528 P.2d 141 (Utah 1974). In Irizarrv the court noted that "the right
of the minor children to support cannot be bartered away, extinguished, estopped or in
any way defeated by the agreement or conduct of the parties". The Court of Appeals
decision that the issue of child support for Matthew is res judicata ignores this principal.
10

A child not born at the time of the litigation certainly had no opportunity to litigate the
issue of his own support. Furthermore, action or inaction by the Plaintiff and
Respondent cannot defeat his right to support by both of his parents. Therefore, the issue
cannot be res judicata, as Matthew's rights have not been extinguished.
In addition, Matthew's mother, the Petitioner, is an appropriate person the enforce
the rights of her son. Although the right to child support belongs to the child the court in
Szarak v. Sandoval pointed out, "the father's liability for the education and support of the
child can be enforced by parties other than the child, but in such cases the child is still the
real party in interest.) 636 P.2d 1082 (Utah 1981).

CONCLUSION
The issues of paternity and the support were not litigated nor could they have been
and are therefore not res judicata. The Court of Appeals incorrectly applied the
principles of res judicata in this case. The Court of Appeals erred in applying the
standard of review for questions of law to issues of fact determined by the trial court.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeals failed to consider that the right to support is the
child's right and that the actions of either party cannot defeat that right.

WHEREFORE, Petitioner, Barbara R. Krambule, respectfully petitions this Court
to grant a writ of certiorari in this matter.
DATED this 14th day of February, 2000.
11

lieeWilliamson
Paige
Counsel for Petitioner
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APPENDIX 1
COURT OF APPEALS RULINGS
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

COUR

00O00

R^cky TD. Kfambule,

MEMORANDUM DECISIC
(Not For Official Publju

Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.

Case No. 980229-CB

Barbara R. Krambule,
F I L E D
( J u l y 9, 1998)

Defendant and Appellee.

Qtn5oo3
Second District, Farmington Department
The Honorable Darwin C. Hanson
Attorneys:

Robert L. Neeley, Ogden, for Appellant
Robert A. Echard, Ogden, for Appellee

Before Judges Davis, Bench, and Greenwood.
PER CURIAM:
This matter is before the court on its own motion for
summary disposition. We dismiss the appeal.
Appellant seeks to appeal the trial court's March 27, 19S
order granting partial summary judgment to appellee and
concluding that appellant is the legal father of the minor chi
in question. However, an order granting only partial summary
judgment is not appealable. See Holt v. Biggs, 714 P.2d 643,
(Utah 1986) ; geefllgQ,Spytfr Shores? CpnqeggJQn Inc. v. State
Division of Parks, 600 P.2d 550, 553 (Utah 1979) (concluding tl
a partial summary judgment is not generally a final judgment ai
hence is not appealable). Since the subject order concerns a
partial summary judgment and the trial court specifically
reserved issues of child support, medical expenses, and other
financial determinations for future resolution following an
evidentiary hearing, we conclude that it is not final.
Absent a Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b) certification, a Utah R. Ap]
P. 5 petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal, o:
a Utah R. Civ. P. 65B petition for extraordinary relief, none oi
which have been filed in this case, we may only consider appeals
from final judgments. See Utah R. App. P. 3(a); Tyler v.

Krambule v. Krambule, No. 981567-CA (Utah App. 12/09/1999)
[1]

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

[2]

Case No. 981567-CA

[3]

1999.UT.0042241 <http ://www. versuslaw. com>

[4]

December 9, 1999

[5]

RICKY D. KRAMBULE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT,
v.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

[6]

Attorneys: Robert L. Neeley, Ogden, for Appellant Robert A. Echard and Steven L.
Fenton, Ogden, for Appellee

[7]

Before Judges Greenwood, Davis, and Orme.

[8]

The opinion of the court was delivered by: Davis, Judge:

[9]

OPINION

[ 10]

(For Official Publication)

[11]

FILED

[12]

Second District, Farmington Department The Honorable Darwin C. Hansen

[13]

]fl Ricky D. Krambule (Rick) appeals the trial court's order granting partial summary
judgment in favor of Barbara R. Krambule, in which the court concluded that Rick was
the legal father of Matthew Krambule, and the subsequent modification of the divorce
decree ordering Rick to pay child support for Matthew. Because Barbara's claim is barred
by res judicata, the trial court erred in finding there was a substantial change in
circumstances and therefore had no basis on which to modify the divorce decree.
Accordingly, we reverse.

[14]

BACKGROUND

[15]

|2 Rick and Barbara were married in 1979. Although they desired to become parents,
they discovered that Rick was sterile. Upon considering various options, the couple
decided to go to the University of Utah School of Medicine so Barbara could be
artificially inseminated with the sperm of an anonymous donor. They tried unsuccessfully
for a number of years to conceive a child, but ultimately, as a result of this procedure,
Barbara conceived a daughter, Stephanie, who was born in 1985.

[16]

]f3 In 1989, after experiencing some marital discord, Rick and Barbara separated.
Eventually, however, the couple reconciled and, in approximately July 1990, decided to
attempt to have another child. To that end, the couple again went to the University of
Utah for artificial insemination. To consent to the procedure, Rick and Barbara entered
into an agreement with the University of Utah, which provided in part:

[17]

2. We hereby affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy and request that artificial
insemination procedures be utilized in an attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife with
semen obtained from an unidentified and undisclosed third party donor(s).

[18]

8. We acknowledge that our participation in the artificial insemination procedure(s) is
voluntary.

[19]

10. We jointly and severally agree to recognize and accept the full legal, moral, parental,
financial, social, emotional and cultural responsibility and care of any offspring that may
result from any pregnancy achieved through the artificial insemination procedure(s). We
also mutually and individually agree to accept and assume the same duties, obligations
and responsibilities toward such offspring to the full extent in the same manner as owed
by the undersigned to naturally occurring offspring, and acknowledge and agree that any
offspring resultingfromthe artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be their legal heirs(s)
and that the said offspring shall be, for all purposes, the child of the husband and wife,
and the husband shall for all purposes be considered the father of the said offspring.

[20]

After entering into the agreement, the couple selected three anonymous donors and began
the artificial insemination process, which included Barbara's submission to ongoing
treatment, medication, and multiple surgeries.

[21]

Tf4 Despite their rejuvenated marriage and plans for the future, more discord arose
between Rick and Barbara and, on or about May 3, 1991, Rick moved out of the home.
Notwithstanding this separation, Barbara continued the artificial insemination process
and, on June 23, 1991, conceived a son, Matthew. *fhl Although Barbara did not inform
Rick that she was continuing the insemination process, in a post-separation letter written
by Rick to Barbara, Rick stated, "if you get pregnant[,] I've got no idea how that's going
to work."

[22]

^[5 A few months after separation, in August 1991, Rick initiated divorce proceedings.
Subsequently, Barbara's counsel wrote a letter to Rick's counsel, advising that Barbara
was pregnant and would not agree to a stipulation and property settlement that did not
provide for support of the expected child. *fh2 Nonetheless, the couple apparently
eventually agreed on an alternative settlement and, on January 16, 1992, they executed a
stipulation which did not require Rick to support the expected child, but did require him
to pay alimony. See supra note 2. After a February 1992 hearing, the commissioner
concluded there were irreconcilable differences and accepted the stipulated settlement.
The minute entryfromthis hearing further indicated, "There is a child expected by
[Barbara] but the child is not [Rick's]."

[23]

f6 Matthew was born on March 24, 1992, and on April 6, 1992, the divorce decree was
entered which incorporated the stipulated settlement. The decree did not require Rick to
pay support for Matthew, but did order support to be paid for the couple's first child,
Stephanie. Rick was also ordered to pay alimony for up to four years or until Barbara
graduated from college, and to pay all reasonable book and tuition expenses for Barbara's
college education.

[24]

]|7 In July 1996, over four years after entry of the divorce decree, Barbara petitioned the
court to modify the decree. In her petition, Barbara requested an increase in child support
for Stephanie and an order for Rick to pay child support for Matthew, asserting "[t]here
has been a material change of circumstances since the Court originally established child
support in this matter consisting in part of an additional child being born to the parties."
Barbara further asserted that the court never ruled on the paternity of Matthew and
requested an order declaring Rick the father.

[25]

f 8 Before trial, both parties moved for summary judgment on the issue of whether Rick
was the legal father of Matthew. Neither party disputed that Rick was not Matthew's
biological father, and the court so ruled. *fh3 The court, however, granted Barbara's
motion, concluding that although not genetically related, Rick had a legal obligation to
Matthew. The court explained that because the couple entered into a binding contract for
artificial insemination which neither party repudiated prior to conception, with respect to
Matthew, both parties had the rights and responsibilities of a natural parent.

f9 The matter subsequently went to trial on the remaining issues of child support,
visitation, day care expenses, medical expenses, medical and life insurance, and attorney
fees, regarding both children. The trial court concluded there had been a substantial
change in circumstances. *fh4 The court also found that before the original divorce
decree was entered Barbara made statements to Rick that she wanted only the Krambule
name for Matthew; that although Barbara was emotional during the divorce process, she
nonetheless testified that her decision to make no claim for Matthew was carefully
considered while she had the assistance of counsel; and that in return for Barbara
abandoning a claim for Matthew's support, Rick agreed to pay alimony and provide for
her education. Accordingly, although the court concluded Rick was responsible for child
support, it ruled that Barbara was equitably estopped from recovering child support for
Matthew accruing before she filed her petition to modify, and thus ordered Rick to pay
child support only prospectively from the date of filing. Rick now appeals from the entire
judgment.

[27]

ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW

[28]

1fl0 On appeal, our review centers on the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment,
in which it ruled that Rick has a duty to support Matthew. '"Summary judgment is
appropriate only when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Because a summary judgment presents questions
of law, we review the trial court's ruling for correctness." In re General Determination of
the Rights to the Use of All the Water, 982 P.2d 65, 69 (Utah 1999) (citations omitted);
see Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Thus, although we generally review the determination to
modify a divorce decree for an abuse of discretion, insofar as that determination is based
on a Conclusion of law, we review it for correctness. See Toone v. Toone, 952 P.2d 112,
114 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). We do not disturb the trial court's factual findings after trial
unless clearly erroneous. See Hudema v. Carpenter, 380 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 5 (Utah Ct.
App. 1999); Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 804 P.2d 530, 534 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (per
curiam).

[29]

ANALYSIS

[30]

%l 1 Rick argues that Barbara may not receive child support for Matthew because such
claim is barred by res judicata, she has waived any contractual rights granted under the
artificial insemination agreement, and she is equitably estopped from claiming that Rick is
Matthew's father. Rick further argues that the insemination agreement was ambiguous
and material issues of fact exist as to the parties' intent. Finally, Rick argues that he
should not be held to be Matthew's legal father because he did not consent to Barbara's
continuing the insemination process after the separation. *fh5

^f 12 We begin our review by evaluating whether res judicata precludes Barbara from
asserting that Rick owed a duty of support for Matthew. "Res judicata has two branches:
claim preclusion and issue preclusion." Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 503 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989). At issue here is the claim preclusion branch of res judicata. "Claim preclusion
prevents relitigation of claims that have been fully litigated between the same parties, and
also precludes claims which 'could and should have been litigated in the prior action, but
were not raised.'" Id. (quoting Copper State Thrift & Loan v. Bruno, 735 P.2d 387, 389
(Utah Ct. App. 1987)) (emphasis added); see also Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 703 P.2d 303,
305 (Utah 1985) ("'When there has been an adjudication, it becomes res judicata as to
those issues which were either tried and determined, or upon all issues which the party
had a fair opportunity to present and have determined in the other proceeding.'") (citation
omitted).

f 13 The principles of res judicata apply fully in the context of divorce proceedings. See
Jacobsen, 703 P.2d at 305. Nonetheless, "[t]he court has continuing jurisdiction to make
subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children and their support... as
is reasonable and necessary." Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) (Supp. 1999); see also Bayles
v. Bayles, 981 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Consequently, principles of res
judicata require that "a party seeking modification of a divorce decree must demonstrate
that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of the decree, and
not contemplated in the decree itself." Bayles, 981 P.2d at 406 (alteration, citations, and
quotation marks omitted); accord Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah Ct. App.
1990). "In the absence of such a showing, the decree shall not be modified . . . ."
Jacobsen, 703 P.2d at 305.

f 14 Although Barbara's petition for modification asked the court to revisit the amount of
child support due with respect to both Stephanie and Matthew, and Matthew was not
mentioned in the original decree, the sole apparent factual basis for a determination of
changed circumstances with respect to Matthew was that Matthew was an additional
child born to the parties but not provided for in the decree.

If 15 Barbara must show that the alleged "'"substantial change in circumstances has
occurred since the entry of the decree."'" Bayles, 981 P.2d at 406 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added). The undisputed facts here show that, other than foreseeable events
occasioned by the passage of time, nothing new has occurred since entry of the divorce
decree. That is, before the decree was entered in April 1992, the 1990 insemination
agreement had been executed and Barbara became pregnant, carried the child to term,
and gave birth. Further, Barbara had full knowledge that she was pregnant as a result of
the insemination procedure at the time she executed the stipulated settlement which
deliberately omitted any obligation for Rick to pay child support for Matthew. Indeed, the
letterfromBarbara's counsel shows she knew she had a claim for Matthew's support at
least three months before the entry of the decree. See Masters, 777 P.2d at 503 (rejecting
application of res judicata to a claim not litigated in earlier divorce proceeding, stating the
claim "could not have been tried in the [original] divorce [proceeding] because [plaintiff]
had no knowledge of the alleged facts supporting his claim"). Finally, after trial on her
petition for modification, the trial court found that although Barbara was emotional

during the divorce process, she testified that her decision not to make a claim for child
support was carefully considered and made with the assistance of counsel, and that in
return for Barbara's abandoning this claim Rick agreed to pay alimony and provide for her
education.
[35]

f 16 In short, there is simply no indication of any circumstances occurring after entry of
the decree supporting a determination that there had been a substantial change of
circumstances. As such, Barbara's claim for child support for Matthew based on the
insemination agreement could and should have been asserted in the original divorce action
and is therefore now barred under the principles of res judicata. Consequently, we have
no option but to conclude that the trial court erred in determining there was a substantial
change in circumstances and thus in modifying the divorce decree to impose a child
support obligation on Rick with respect to Matthew. *ffa6

[36]

CONCLUSION

[37]

If 17 We conclude that because all facts relating to Barbara's claim for Matthew's support
were in existence and known to the parties prior to entry of the divorce decree, there has
been no substantial changed circumstances warranting modification. Hence, Barbara is
barred by principles of res judicata from now asserting her contractual claim for
Matthew's support which could and should have been litigated in the original proceeding.
Consequently, we reverse the trial court's grant of partial summary judgment, and remand
for entry of partial summary judgment in favor of Rick. We further reverse those portions
of the trial court's final order based on the determination that Rick was Matthew's legal
father, and remand for entry of a newfinalorder consistent with this opinion.

[38]

%l8 Reversed and remanded.

[39]

James Z. Davis, Judge

[40]

1J19 WE CONCUR:

[41]

Pamela T. Greenwood, Associate Presiding Judge

[42]

Gregory K. Orme, Judge

Opinion Footnotes

*fhl . The record does not reflect that Rick made any effort to contact the University of
Utah to withdraw his consent to the artificial insemination.
*fh2 . The letter provided: In connection with the above matter, my client [Barbara] has
recently brought to my attention an item that she debated at great lengths whether she
should or should not pursue and hasfinallydecided she's going to pursue it. Your client
and my client agreed to artificial insemination so that the parties could have another child.
This artificial insemination was in fact conducted and as a result my client is pregnant and
expecting a child. [Barbara] is somewhere between 4 and 6 months pregnant and since
[Rick] agreed to the artificial insemination and she's going to obtain for me his written
consent, the child is his and I've tried this before where the Court has acknowledged these
types of agreements. My client has indicated that if he will not put up a fuss over this
child, pay the child support in accordance with the schedule for the children, then she
would give up any claim she has to alimony. In addition, she indicated that she would
allow overnight visits on Mondays and Wednesdays and when school is not in session,
which would include holidays and summer vacation. Please review this with your client,
get back with me and if we can work out a Stipulation along those lines, let me know.
The Stipulation you sent me does not provide for that and my client is not willing to sign
it. I did forward to [Barbara] a copy, she has it, and that's what brought this to mind
because she does not feel that this child should be left out and the parties would then have
two children, Stephanie and whatever this child turns out to be, whether it's a boy or a
girl. Please review this with your client and get back with me[,] and if we can resolve it[,]
great[,] and if not, then let's get it tried. I don't believe we've had a Pre-trial yet[,] and if
your client is not willing to negotiate this item[,] then one or both of us shouldfilea
request for Pre-trial. I will await your response.
*fh3 . Neither party challenges this determination (characterized as afindingof fact) on
appeal.
*fh4 . The trial court failed to identify with particularity those facts supporting its
Conclusion that ,f[t]here has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of
the Decree of Divorce" as required. See Butler, Crockett & Walsh Dev. Corp. v.
Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 231 (Utah 1995) ("Tailure of the trial
court to makefindingson all material issues is reversible error unless the facts in the
record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only afindingin favor of the
judgment.,M") (citations omitted). Regarding Matthew, the only apparent fact supporting
the Conclusion is the court's earlier ruling that Rick was legally liable under the contract.
Because Rick does not raise this omission as a basis for reversal, we dispose of this
appeal on other grounds.

[47]

*fh5 . We note that the trial court correctly analyzed Rick's obligations as arising under
contract. Whereas the Legislature has addressed issues involving adoption and surrogate
mothers, see Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-204 (1999) (prohibiting entry into surrogate
contracts for profit and providing, inter alia, that "the surrogate mother is the mother of
the child for all legal purposes"); id. §§ 78-30-1 to -19 (1996 & Supp. 1999) (outlining
procedures, rights, and obligations in adoption context), when there is an artificial
insemination using an anonymous donor's sperm, it has not yet addressed the rights and
obligations of the parties involved, including the biological father, the biological mother
and her husband, the child, or the health care provider.

[48]

*fh6 . Our Disposition on this basis forecloses the need to address Rick's alternate
arguments.
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TRIAL COURT RULINGS
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
RICKY D. KRAMBULE,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ON
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Defendant.

Civil No. 910750473
Judge: Darwin Hanson

The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin
Hanson on the 21st day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment,
the court having reviewed materials submined by counsel and having heard argument from the
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore, the court makes
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The court does not have the evidentiary information necessary to make a

MT ECHARD
SSOCIATES
V OFFICES
WILDING, SUITE 200 I
SGTON BOULEVARD |
N, UTAH 84401
il) 393-2300
(801)393-2340

determination as to the amount of child support, medical expenses and other financial
determinations that have been raised by the parties in their pleadings.

2.

The court is treating this matter as a motion for partial summary judgment

and will rule solely in the issue of whether or not the Plaintiff is the legal father of the minor child
in question.
3.

The Plaintiff is not the biological father of the minor child.

4.

In modern society, birth is possible by artificial insemination other means.

Consequently, the court must look at the facts surrounding the artificial insemination to determine
the legal obligations of the parties engaged in that type of conception.
5.

The court finds that on July 18, 1990 the parties entered into a contract

entitled, "Consent to Perform Procedures to Achieve Pregnancy through Artificial Insemination
of Donor Sperm". The court finds that this contract obligated the Plaintiff and the Defendant to
assume the legal responsibility for the child that was produced from artificial insemination. This
legal duty included all of the rights of a minor child of natural parents.
6.

The court finds that this was the second contract the parties had entered into

of this nature and that a child was produced from the first contract for which both parties have
assume the full rights as natural parents.
7.

The court finds that in order for this contract to be null and void, an event

must occur which would terminate the contract. The court does not rule on all the events that could
terminate such a contract, however, in this case the court rules that a divorce could have terminated
the contract. The court finds that in this case the child was conceived during the marriage and bom
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prior to the divorce being granted. Consequently, the contract was not terminated.

8.

The court finds there is a strong public policy to protect the interest of a

minor child. A separation of the parties is not sufficient to repudiate the contract and the court
finds that only a divorce obtained prior to the conception of the child would be sufficient to
repudiate the contract in this case.
9.

The court finds that the Plaintiff is legally the father of the minor child,

Matthew, who was born on March 24, 1992.
10.

The Plaintiff has all of the obligations and rights associated with being the

natural parent of Matthew.
11.

The remaining issues that have not been resolved shall be set for a trial.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1.

The Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a legally binding contract for

artificial insemination.
2.

The contract was not repudiated by the separation of the parties and in this

case could only be repudiated by a divorce which occurred prior to the conception of the child.
3.

The child in this case, Matthew, was conceived and born prior to the divorce

4.

The contract is binding between the parties and imposes on both parties the

of the parties.

legal responsibilities of natural parents to the child.
5.

of a natural parent in regards to Matthew, born on March 24,1992.
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6.

The remaining issues that have been unresolved shall be set for an

evidentiary trial.
DATED t h i s ^ f day of March, 1998.

DARWIN HANSON
District Court Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL:
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature
upon the expiration of five (5) daysfromthe date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3)
days for mailing, unless written objection isfiledprior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.

DATED this^_ day of March, 1998.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s):
Robert L. Neeley
2485 Grant Ave., #200
Ogden,UT 84401
DATED this fc^day of March, 1998.

LEGAL ASSISTANT
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DISTRICT COURT

ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Defendant
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICKY D.KRAMBULE,
Plaintiff,

ORDER ON MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Civil No. 910750473
Defendant.

Judge:"TX,0u hU-i

The above entitled matter came on for a hearing before the Honorable Darwin
Hanson on the 21 * day of January, 1998. Both parties having filed motions for summary judgment,
the court having reviewed materials submitted by counsel and having heard argument from the
counsel for the parties and being fully informed in the premises, now therefore,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

The court grants the Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment.

2.

The Plaintiff has all the legal obligations and rights of a natural parent in

r ECHARD
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regard to Matthew Krambule, born on March 24,1992.
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the court.

The remaining evidentiary issues shall be determined at a trial to be set by

^
DATED this^ZI
day of March, 1998.

f/W>*//
District Court Judge
NOTICE TO COUNSEL
TO: PLAINTIFF AND HIS COUNSEL:
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for Defendant will submit
the foregoing Order on Motion for Summary Judgment to Judge Darwin Hanson for his signature
upon the expiration of five (5) daysfromthe date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3)
days for mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration 1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly.
DATED t h i s ^ day of March, 1998.

ROBERT A. ECHARD
Attorney for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document(s), postage prepaid, to the following individual(s):
Robert L. Neeley
2485 Grant Ave., #200
Ogden, UT 84401
DATED this

<Aay of March, 1998.
LEGAL ASSISTANT
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Respondent
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Respondent.

Civil No. 910750473
Judge:

The above entitled matter came before the court on the 30th day of April, 1998 on
Respondent's Petition for Modification. The Petitioner was present in court represented by his
attorney Robert L. Neeley and the Respondent was present in court represented by her attorney
Robert A. Echard. The court having received testimony, exhibits, arguments and the contents of
the legal memorandum, now therefore the court makes the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
HT ECHARD
SSOCIATES

1.

The parties were married on the 31 st day of March, 1979.
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2.

Two (2) children were conceived by artificial insemination and born during the

course of the marriage, namely: STEPHANIE KRAMBULE, born on January 29, 1985 and
MATTHEW WADE KRAMBULE, born on March 24, 1992.
3.

A Decree of Divorce was signed and entered by the Court on the 3rd day of

4.

At the time of the Divorce, the Petitioner monthly income was $3,250.00 and

April, 1992.

the Respondent's monthly income was $2,042.00.
5.

The present annual income of the parties is as follows:

Petitioner:
a.

Wages - Alpine Paving Mgnmt.

$75,000.00

b.

Alpine Paving and Const.

$37,317.00

c.

Rent

$18,613.00
TOTAL

$130,930.00

Therefore, Petitioner's current monthly income is $10,911.00.
The court does not credit line 7 of the Respondent's Exhibit 7 as income for child
support because it is the finding of the court that the sum of $44,132.00 is necessary retained
earnings of the company to operate the business during the coming accounting year of the business.
Under Section 78-45-7.5(4)(a) UCA, monies for business expenses are not considered income for
child support purposes.
LCHARD
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Respondent:
a.

Wages - Hill Air Force Base

$42,452.00

s u m : 2001
I BOULEVARD |
H S4401
2300
93-2340
NG,

-CX J>

Therefore, Respondent's current monthly income is $3,538.00.
6.

The Decree of Divorce is silent concerning Matthew, but provides the following

for Stephanie:
a.

Paragraph 2 gives custody of Stephanie to the Respondent;

b.

Paragraph 3 gives Petitioner standard visitation;

c.

Paragraph 5 awards Respondent $326.00 per month for child support;

d.

Paragraph 7 requires each to pay one-half of the daycare expenses for

Stephanie.
7.

The Petitioner is current with the payment of child support for Stephanie

through August, 1997, at which time she began living with Petitioner. The court makes no finding
or order from that date forward in that Petitioner has a Petition for Change of Custody as to
Stephanie which is presently pending.
8.

The Petitioner previously disclaimed paternity and therefore denied any legal

responsibility for Matthew in that Respondent conceived after the parties separated. This court has
heretofore ruled pursuant to Respondent's Motion for Partial Summary Judgement that given the
factual predicate of this case, Petitioner is the legal father of Matthew and therefore has the legal
duties of a biological father. Petitioner, however, alleges that Respondent should be estopped from
now claiming past legal benefits for Matthew in that she engaged in conduct at the time of the
divorce which reasonably induced Petitioner to rely thereon to his detriment.
RT ECHARD

9.

The Courtfindsthe following with respect to Petitioner's Estoppel argument:
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a.

During late October, 1991, after Respondent' s pregnancy with Matthew

became known, Respondent told Petitioner that she only wanted the Krambule name for Matthew
and nothing more from him;
b.

She essentially made the same statement to Petitioner's sister sometime

c.

After Petitioner filed fro divorce, she initially requested support for the

later.

expectant child through her then attorney, but later signed a stipulation silent on the matter of the
child. She further allowed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Divorce to issue
without any mention of Matthew though he was born at the time.
d.

I hjnun the divorce process, Respondent was very emotional about the

matter and spent some time in the hospital in December, 1991 as a result. Nevertheless, she
testified that her decision to make no claim for Matthew was carefully considered and was made
during the period she had the assistance of counsel.
e.

She filed her petition to modify the Decree of Divorce and for Paternity

as to Matthew on July 15,1996,4 years and 3 months after the entry of the Decree of Divorce. The
filing of the Petition was precipitated by Petitioner's failure to accept responsibility for Matthew
following counseling by the parties as to how the matter concerning the child's fatherless
circumstance should be handled.
10.
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In return for Respondent's failure to act, or to make claim against Petitioner for

legal benefits concerning I\ latthew , lie agreed to pa.) Respondent alimony, provide for her

education at Weber State University in Ogden, Utah, and preceded to live his life without
consideration as to any financial obligation for Matthew.
11.

Respondent has incurred the following medical debts for herself and Matthew

from the time of her conception with Matthew until the filing of her Petition to Modify the Decree
of Divorce:
Nature of Debt

Year

Amount

Medical
Pharmaceutical
Medical

1991
1991
1992

$1,996.95
$ 151.52
$5,872.32

TOTAL
12.

$8,020.79

Respondent has incurred the following child care expenses for Stephanie and

Matthew since the entry of the Decree of Divorce:

13.

Child

Year

Amount

Stephanie
Stephanie
Stephanie & Matthew
Stephanie
Matthew
Matthew
Matthew
Matthew
Matthew

1991
1992
1992
1993
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

$ 770.00
$ 361.00
$1,627.25
$ 835.70
$1,927.35
$2,860.00
$2,339.00
$ 956.00
$1,106.00

Respondent's reasonable monthly needs for her and both children are as

follows:
;RT ECHARD
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Item (family expenses)

Amount

Mortgage on home
Maintenance on home

$ 806.00
$ 27.00

Utilities
Phone
Transportation (gas & oil for car)
Food
Misc.
TOTAL

$ 141.00
45.00
$
$ 150.00
$ 300.00
$ 300.00

$1,769.00

Item (children expenses)

Amount

Clothing
School Expenses
School Lunches
Co-Pay Medical
Co-Pay Dental
Health Insurance
Misc.

$ 75.00
$ 100.00
80.00
$
50.00
$
10.00
$
$ 36.00
$ 300.00

TOTAI •

$ 651.00

Each child's need is therefore equal to 1/3 of the family expenses plus lA of the children's expenses
or $915.00.
14.

Respondent ha s inci u red attorney's fees regarding her I>etition for 1\ lodification

and for Paternity as follows:
Nature of Charge

Rate

Amount

Attorney fees

$l50/hr.

$5,803.13

The total amount does not include fees associated with Petitioner's pending Modification of Decree
of Divorce concerning a change of custody of Stephanie. Moreover, it appears that the approximate
number of hours expended is 39 which the court finds reasonable given the nature of the issues
ECHARD
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ING,

raised in the proceeding

I lit: court lurther finds the hourly rate to be reasonable.

15.

The court also finds that Respondent is in need of assistance in paying the

attorney's fees. She has been using her credit card to make ends meet. She has received no
assistance from Petitioner for her medical care or for Stephanie's child care heretofore itemized
above.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

There has been a substantial change of circumstances since the entry of the

Decree of Divorce.
2.

Respondent is a fit and proper person to be awarded the care, custody and

control of Matthew with Petitioner having a reasonable right of visitation based on the statutory
guidelines.
3.

The parties combined income exceeds the highest amount set forth in the Basic

Combined Child Support Obligation Table. The Court therefore applies the Common Law in
determining what a reasonable child support should be. Based on Finding No. 12(?) above, a
reasonable child support should be the percentage of the parties income to the combined total
multiplied by $915.00. The combined income is $10,911.00 plus $3,538.00 which equals
$14,449.00. Petitioner's gross income is 75.5% of that total. Therefore, Petitioner should pay to
Respondent 75.5% of the demonstrated child support. 75.5% of $915.00 is $691.00 for each child.
Therefore, Respondent should be awarded child support from the Petitioner for both children in
the total sum of $1,382.00 per month beginning with the month of August, 1996, which is the
RT ECHARD
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month following the month Respondent filed her Petition for Modification.

4.

The Court concludes that the child support should be retroactive to the date

stated above for the following reasons:
a.

Stephanie:

Petitioner has resisted a child support increase for

Stephanie though his income has significantly increased since the divorce was granted. This is
demonstrated by most, if not all, of the child support checks ha\ ing the initial's R.Q.F.O. written
on each. Petitioner testified that the initials stand for "Bitch Queen F

Off." The initials started

appearing soon after Petitioner remarried. The Court concludes that the only reason for placing
initials of that kind on a child support check is to intimidate and manipulate. Conduct of that kind
only protracts litigation and does not contribute to a timely resolution.
b.

Iv latthew :

Ilie Court concludes that Petitioner is legally responsible

for paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statute limits the period to four (4) years
prior to the determination of paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past child
support based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel if applicable In this matter, the Court finds
that Respondent's conduct, or lack thereof, during the pregnancy and divorce proceedings, is
sufficient to disallow payment foi back child support beyond the date she filed for a determination
of Matthew's paternity based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel.
5.

Therefore, the Courtfindsthat Respondent should be awarded judgment against

Petitioner for back child support as follows:
a.

The amount of the judgment equals $691.00 per month

for \?> months (boginniny August, 1996 and ending August, 1997 when Stephanie began living

ECHARD
CIATES

with her father) less $326.00 per month for the 13 month period for child support that was paid.
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The amount is $4,745.00. The period from August, 1997 to date is yet to be determined in
connection with Petitioner's Petition for Modification.
b.

Matthew:

The amount of the judgment is $691.00 per month for

20 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending April, 1998) which equals $13,820.00. Therefore,
the total judgment for past due child support is $18,565.00
6.

Each of the parties should be ordered to pay one-half of all future child care for

the children according to the applicable statutory provisions.
7.

Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner for past due child

care pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce as follows:
a.

Stephanie:

The past due child care is calculated as follows:

Year

Amount

1992

$135.00

$361 divided by 2 multiplied
by 0.75 (April through Dec.)
$1627 divided by 4
1993 $835.70 divided by 2
Total
b.

Matthew:

$407.00
$418.00
$960.00

The past due child care is only applicable from August,

1996 through April, 1998 based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel as follows:
Year
1996
1997

Amount
$969 times 0.42 (5 months
of the year) divided by 2
$1,106 divided by 2

$201.00
$553.00

f*T ECHARD
SSOCIATES
V OFFICES
WILDING, SUITE 200 I
«GTON BOULEVARD |
N, UTAH 84401
1)393-2300
(801)393-2340

Total

$754.00

8.

The Court concludes that Respondent should keep medical insurance on the

children in accordance with the applicable statute regarding the sharing of the premiums and costs
not covered by the policy. The Court makes no award for past medical expenses because they are
not applicable as to Matthew under the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the evidence was
insufficient to break out those expenses applicable to Respondent ii individually and those applicable
to the pregnancy and birth of Matthew.
9.

Petitioner should be awarded Stephanie as an exemption on his IRS return and

Respondent should be awarded Matthew as an exemption on her IRS return

A t such time as

Stephanie is no longer eligible to be taken by Petitioner, then the parties should alternate Matthew
as an exemption w ith Petitionei ta king him the first year after Stephanie is not long eligible.
Petitioner's right to take either of the children as an exemption in any year is contingent upon his
being current with his child support payments to Respondent as of the end of that particular year.
10.

Respondent should be awarded judgment against Petitioner for attorney's fees

in the sum of $5,803.00 and costs as taxed by the Court pursuant to an appropriate application by
Kespondeni
DATED t h i s ^ L

da

y of-Meyf 1998.

Distric
LCHARD
CIATES
FICES
ENG, SUITE 2001
i BOULEVARD |
LH 84401
•2300
93-2340
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ROBERT A. ECHARD, 953
ROBERT ECHARD & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Respondent
Key Bank Building, Suite 200
2491 Washington Boulevard
Ogden,UT 84401
Telephone: 801-393-2300
Facsimile: 801-393-2340

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,
Petitioner,

MODIFIED DECREE OF
DIVORCE

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,
Respondent.

Civil No. 910750473
Judge:

The above entitled matter came before the court on the 30th day of April, 1998 on
Respondent's Petition for Modification. The Petitioner was present in court represented by his
attorney Robert L. Neeley and the Respondent was present in court represented by her attorney
Robert A. Echard. The court having received testimony, exhibits, arguments and the contents of
the legal memorandum, now therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Respondent is awarded the care, custody and control of Matthew with Petitioner

n ECHARD
5SOCIATES
V OFFICES
WILDING, SUITE 200 I
JGTON BOULEVARD |
*, UTAH S4401
1)393-2300
801)393-2340

having a reasonable right of visitation based on the statutory guidelines.
2.

The parties combined income exceeds the highest amount set forth in the Basic

Combined Child Support Obligation Table. The Court therefore applies the Common Law in

determining what a reasonable child support should be. Child support shall be the percentage of
the parties income to the combined total multiplied by $915.00. The combined income is
$10,911.00 plus $3,538.00 which equals $14,449.00. Petitioner's gross income is 75.5% of that
total. Therefore, Petitioner shall pay to Respondent 75.5% of the demonstrated child support.
75.5% of $915.00 is $69L00 for each child. Th Respondent is awarded child support from the
Petitioner for both children in the total sum of $1,382.00 per month beginning with the month of
August, 1996, which is the month following the month Respondent filed her Petition for
Modification.
3.

The child support shall be retroactive to the date stated above for the following

reasons:
a.

Stephanie:

Petitioner has resisted a child support increase for

Stephanie though his income has significantly increased since the divorce was granted. This is
demonstrated try most, if not all, erf the child support cl leeks ha\ ing the initial's B.Q.I \ 0 written
on each. Petitioner testified that the initials stand for "Bitch Queen F

Off." The initials started

appearing soon after Petitioner remarried. The Court concludes that the only reason for placing
initials of that kind on a child support check is to intimidate and manipulate. Conduct of that kind
only protracts litigation and does not contribute to a timely resolution.
b.

Matthew:

Die Court coi lcludes that Petitioner is legally responsible

for paying back child support for Matthew. The paternity statute limits the period to four (4) years
ECHARD

prior to the determination of paternity. Case law further allows for limiting the time for past child

>CIATES
FFICES
DING, SUITE 200 I
)N BOULEVARD j
TAH 84401
3-2300
393-2340

support based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel if applicable. In this matter, the Court finds

that Respondent's conduct, or lack thereof, during the pregnancy and divorce proceedings, is
sufficient to disallow payment for back child support beyond the date she filed for a determination
of Matthew's paternity based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel.
4.

The Respondent is awarded a judgment against Petitioner for back child support

as follows:
a.

Stephanie:

The amount of the judgment equals $691.00 per month

for 13 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending August, 1997 when Stephanie began living
with her father) less $326.00 per month for the 13 month period for child support that was paid.
The amount is $4,745.00. The period from August, 1997 to date is yet to be determined in
connection with Petitioner's Petition for Modification.
b.

Matthew:

The amount of the judgment is $691.00 per month for

20 months (beginning August, 1996 and ending April, 1998) which equals $13,820.00. Therefore,
the total judgment for past due child support is $18,565.00
5.

Each of the parties is ordered to pay one-half of all future child care for the

children according to the applicable statutory provisions.
6.

Respondent is awarded a judgment against Petitioner for past due child care

pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the Decree of Divorce as follows:
a.

RT ECHARD
SSOCIATES
W OFFICES
BUILDING, s u m :

2001

[NGTON BOULEVARD |
5N, UTAH 84401
Dl) 393-2300
(801)393-2340

Stephanie:

The past due child care is calculated as follows:

Year

Amount

1992 $361 divided by 2 multiplied
by 0.75 (April through Dec.)
$1627 divided by 4
1993 $835.70 divided by 2

$135.00
$407.00
$418.00

Total
b.

Matthew:

$960.00

The past due child care is only applicable from August,

1996 through April, 1998 based on the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel as follows:
Year

Amount

1996 $969 times 0.42 (5 months
of the year) divided by 2
1997 $1,106 divided by 2

$201.00

Total
• • 7.

$553.00
$754.00

The Respondent shall keep medical insurance on the children in accordance

with the applicable statute regarding the sharing of the premiums and costs not covered by the
policy. The Court makes no award for past medical expenses because they are not applicable as
to Matthew under the doctrine of Equitable Estoppel and the evidence was insufficient to break out
those expenses applicable to Respondent individually and those applicable to the pregnancy and
birth ot Matthew.
8.

Petitioner is awarded Stephanie as an exemption on his IRS return and

Respondent is awarded Matthew as an exemption on hei IRS return At such time as Stephanie is
no longer eligible to be taken by Petitioner, then the parties shall alternate Matthew as an
exemption with Petitioner taking him the first year after Stephanie is not long eligible. Petitioner's
i ight to take either of the children, as an exemption in any year is contingent upon his being current
with his child support payments to Respondent as of the end of that particular year.
n

ECHARD

SSOCIATES
V OFFICES
WILDING, SUITE 200 I
¥GTON BOULEVARD |
N, UTAH S440I
1) 393-2300
(801)393-2340

&

%

9.

Respondent is awarded judgment against Petitioner for attorney's fees in the

sum of $5,803.00 and costs as taxed by the Court pursuant to an appropriate application by
Respondent.
DATED this /

day oQJfrf, 1998.

DA^WJK C.HANSEN
District Court Judge

JUDQI^NT ENTERED

CHARD
IATES
CES
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APPENDIX 3

UNIVERSITY OF UTAH SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
DEPARTMENT OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY
AND
DIVISION OF UROLOGY
CONSENT TO PERFORM PROCEDURES TO ACHIEVE PREGNANCY
THROUGH ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION OF DONOR SEMEN

1.
We, as husband and wife* acknowledge that we have been
unable to achieve a pregnancy
because of one or more of the
following
conditions, notwithstanding
thorough
evaluation and
therapy:
<A)

Abnormality of the semen, including reduced
numbers, and/or quality or absence of sperm;

<B)

Cervical disease, including immobilization
sperm;

<C)

Endometriosis;

(D)

Other causes including unexplained

<E)

Or have genetic problems.

of the

infertility;

£.
We hereby
affirm our desire to achieve pregnancy and
request that artificial insemination procedures be utilized in an
attempt to achieve pregnancy in the wife with semen obtained from
an unidentified and undisclosed third party donor(s).
(A)

In order
to facilitate
the success
of
this
procedure?
we agree
to follow procedures and
complete
documentation
as
outlined
by the
Department
of Obstetrics and/or the Division of
Urology of the University
of Utah
School
of
Medicine.

3.
We are aware, on the basis of present information, the
chances that a pregnancy will be achieved
by the artificial
insemination
procedure(s) are 4>0-75/. through
six cycles, and
acknowledge that no representations or guarantees, express or
implied,
have
been made to us with respect
to whether the
procedure(s) will be successful.
A».
We have been fully
informed of all known significant
and substantial
risks incident
to artificial
insemination,
whether fresh or frozen semen is used, which include:
1

i nfec t ion;

(A)

B 1 eed i i iq and/or

(B)

Pain associated with the various procedures;

(C)

Discomfort
and
complictions
connectea
pregnancyi childbirth and delivery;

(D)

Birth of an infant or infants suffering from any
birth defect(s), or of abnormalities of any kind?
including but not
limited
to
infection(s) or
disease(s) transmitted through donor semen;

(E)

Uncertainty of
genetic. hereditary
tendencies of such offspring;

(F)

Other adverse consequences of any kind, which are
unknown but may arise or be connected directly or
indirectly to the artificial
insemination and/or
procedure(s).

traits

with

or

5.
We acknowledge
that if pregnancy
is achieved
there is
no assurance of a live or healthy birth, or of a normal genetic
contribution from the donor's sperm* and that in any event, all
pregnancies face a 3-4*/. risk of some birth defect.
6.
We have been offered the option of carrier
testing or
chromosome
testing of the donor
if there
is a history of
autosomal
recessive
trait
or
a
heritable
chromosomal
translocation in the wife.
7.
We have had an unlimited opportunity to ask questions
about the procedure(s) and the risks involved, ana our questions
have been fully answered to our satisfaction.
8.
We acknowledge that our participation in the artificial
insemination procedure(s) is voluntary,
9.
In order to artificially
inseminate the wife, the
doctor hereafter identified shall obtain the necessary semen from
a third party donor, selected by the doctor. The donor shall not
at any
time be advised of the identity of the wife, nor of the
success or failure of the insemination.
The undersigned, and
each of them, agree that the identity of the donor shall not be
divulged
to them or
any
offspring
resulting
from such
insemination
for any reason by the doctor, except upon the
issuance of a duly authorized
ordei
of court of competent
jurisdiction, the issuance of which shall not be sought by the
undersigned.
The doctor shall require the donor
to agree in
writing not to seek out the identity of the undersigned.

a

10. We jointly
and severally agree to recognize and accept
the full legal, moral, parental, financial, sociali emotional ana
cultural responsibility and care of any offspring that may result
from any pregnancy achieved
through the artificial insemination
procedure(s).
We also mutually and individually agree to accept
and assume
the same duties, obligations
and responsibilities
toward such
offspring to the full extent in the same manner as
owea by the undersigned
to naturally
occurring
offspring, and
acknowledge
and
agree that any offspring
resulting from the
artificial insemination procedure(s) shall be their legal heir(s)
and that the said offspring shall be, for all purposes, the child
of the husband and wife, and the husband
shall for
all purposes
be considered the father of the said offspring.
11. The doctor
in consultation
with husband
and wife may
use fresh or frozen semen from one or more unidentified donors,
to select
the donor(s),
including
the
laboratory
which has
collected, processed and stored the semen.
It is understood that
risk factors
set forth in paragraph M A ) , (C), t* (D) are greater
where fresh sperm is used, but we accept those risks.
IE. We hereby covenant and
agree, without
reservation of
rignt, in law or equity, to indemnify, hold harmless and release
the doctor, the persons who are the donors of the semen, those
persons who
collect, store, and/or preserve
and manipulate the
semen specimens, the University of Utah,
the university
of Utah
Hosoitalj
the Deoartment
of Obstetrics ana Gynecology,
the
Division of Urology, their officers, employees
and agents from
any and all liability or obligation
of any kind whatsoever, in
any manner connected with or related to:
(A)

Complications of pregnancy;

<B)

Complications in any manner
birth and/or delivery;

<C)

Birth of any infant or infants suffering from any
birth defect, or of abnormalities of any kino,
including but
not
limited
to infections or
transmitted diseased through donor semen;

(D)

Genetic, hereditary
offspring;

(E)

Any other adverse consequences of any kind that
may arise or be connected directly
or indirectly
to or in any manner with offspring resulting from
the artificial
insemination
and/or procedure(s)
herein authorized or contemplated.

traits or

connected with child

tendencies of such

13. We agree,
individually and
severally, that neither of
them will at any time, or for any reason assist, aid or abet in
3

any way,
dr), fDerson, including
initiating or pursuing any claim or
to any matter arising
out of, or
insemination proceaure(s) authorized

any child
or offspring
in
legal proceeding with respect
resulting from the artificial
herein.

!<•. We agree
and acknowledge
that
the procedures<s)
authorized herein shall be considered for all purposes, medical
services.
15. With the above considerations in mind, we, individually
and as husband and wife? hereby consent toi request and authorize
Dr,
\N c < ^
, who
is herein referred
to as "our
doctor,"andsuch
assistants
and associates as our doctor may
designate,
tfo undertake one or more artificial insemination
proceaures
in
in attempt
to achieve pregnancy
in the wife,
understanding and acceptinq all
the risks and responsibilities
attendant thereto.
16.
Confidentiality.
We understand
that our doctor, the
Department of Obstetrics and Gynecology, the Division of Urology
and
the University
of Utah, will consider
the
information
developed aoout us during
this treatment
as confidentiali and
that neither
our identity nor specific
medical details will be
revealed by any of them without
our prior
consent; however,
soecific
medical
details may
be revealed
in professional
publications, but our
identify
is not
to be revealed.
We
unaerstana
that
in tne event
an authorized government agency
reviews this or other documents, they may learr of our identity.
17. Procedures Authorized to Treat Unforeseen Conditions.
We recognize
that during
the course of any of the procedures
outlined above, unforeseen conditions may necessitate additional
or different procedures than those set forth above. In the event
we authorize
and request our doctor, his assistants or his
designees, to perform such procedures as are in the exercise of
professional judgment necessary and desirable.
18. We acknowledge
that
the University
of
Utah, tne
University
of
Utah School
of Medicine,
the Department
of
Obstetrics and
Gynecology, the Division of Urology, and all
officers and
employees, including our doctor, are subject to the
provisions of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act, Section 63-30.li et seq . , U.C.A,
1953 as amended, which Act controls all
procedures and limitations with respect to claims of liability.
19. Consent Agreement Binding Upon the Heirs. This Consent
Agreement shall be binding upon our administrators and heirs.

h

SO. Signatures.
We acknowledge by our signatures below
that we have read the foregoing and that all questions pertaining
thereto have been answered to our satisfaction.
UNDERSIGNED:
Wife: T^Y>
Date: \ <5r • Y • y^ - o
•3

Husband;

Date:
WITNESS:

O t - . ~ . * • vju-,
SIGNATURE OF DOCTOR PROVIDING
THE ABOVE INFORMATION:
TV-'}

Date:

l-l^O
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It couldn't hurt to read this:
It won't take that long. Don't throw it away.
And just so you don't get to the end of this and say, "you should have thought
about that." I know I should have. Believe me.
What I'd like you to think about is whether over the last year and a half, I've acted
like someone who wasn't happy with his life, and went out "looking" for someone else?
This is why I keep reminding you that she called me. (Yes, I know I should have hung
up.)
In the last year and a half, we've planned for a new house, vacations, babies,
furniture, drapes, you name it. We've talked about how to deal with the loss of your job,
Steph's problems in school, and on and. We've gone out more, camped more, and had
more fun than we had in five years put together.
This was not all some elaborate scheme to deceive you, it was how I really felt,
and howlstill do?7rhe reality of it is that everything really happened. It's all been true.
And then I screwed up.
Look at it all together, and put it in perspective. It was a moment of weakness vs
a year and a half or trying hard at happiness.
The alternative is ????. There's no way you're going to go to school full time,
because my income alone won't support two households. We might even be talking stuff
like whether S£§5$ can go to college or not. And if you get pregnant I've got no idea how
—
that's going to work. Think about it.
' "
•
^
One of your few faults is that you're too tough. We've talked about it and its
probably from your childhood, but you feel that if you soften up and compromise a little,
you're being weak. (You were soft on Thursday night, and I think you had a better
handle on this whole thing then you've had since) Understanding and sympathy are not
weak. Don't be too tough for your own good.
Love,
Rick

ROBERT L. NEELEY #2373
OF CAMPBELL & NEELEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
2485 Grant Ave., Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
Telephone: 621-3646

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

]\

RICKY D. KRAMBULE,

STIPULATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Plaintiff,

vs.
BARBARA R. KRAMBULE,

)

Judge:

W7W7?

I civil No.

Defendant.

WHEREAS, the plaintiff above named has commenced an
action for divorce in the above-entitled Court; and
WHEREAS,
agreeing

the

parties

are

at tnis time with respect

desirous

of

stipulating

to the issues raised

and

by said

action, NOW THEREFORE,
IT IS HEREBY

STIPULATED AND AGREED

by and

between

the

parties hereto as follows, to-wit:
1.

That

plaintiff

may

have

his

hearing

to obtain

a

mutual divorce in said action at any time without further notice to
defendant, subject to the terms and conditions of this Stipulation
and Agreement.
2.

That

defendant

control of the parties' minor
birth January 29, 1985.

is

awarded

the

care,

custody

and

child, Stephanie Krambule, date of

STIPULATION
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE
Civil No. 910750473

3.
visitation

That

plaintiff

rights as utilized

shall
by

be

granetd

the Second

the

standard

Judicial

District

Court, Davis County, but in addition, shall be entitled to have the
minor child each Monday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:00 p.m. and each
Wednesday from 5:00 p.m. until 8:30 p.m. provided, however, that
plaintiff shall pick up the minor child from the day care provider
and shall return the minor child to the defendant's home at the
time stated above.
4.

That

defendant

shall maintain

child on her health and accident
Base.

the parties1 minor

insurance with Hill Air Force

Each party shall pay one-half the non-covered medical and

dental expenses incurred for benefit of the parties' minor child
and

incorporate The Standard Medical

above-entitled Court herein.

Provisions adopted

by the

The Standard Medical Provisions is

attached hereto and by reference made a part of this Stipulation.
In the event defendant does not have available to her at her place
of employment a medical and health plan, plaintiff shall obtain a
medical and health plan for benefit of the parties' minor child
through his employment.
5.

That plaintiff

shall pay to defendant the sum of

$326.00 per month as and for child support based upon his gross
annual earnings of $39,000.00 per year through Alpine Paving &
Construction and considering defendant's gross annual earnings of

(^

STIPULATION
KRAMBULE VS. KRAMBULE
Civil No. 910750473

$24,500.00 from Hill Air Force Base.
6.

That plaintiff

shall pay to defendant the sum of

$274.00 per month as and for alimony for a period not to exceed
four years from June 1, 1991 or until defendant graduates from
Weber State University whichever event comes first; also, alimony
shall

terminate

by

operation

of

law,

i.e.

cohabitation

or

remarr iage.
7.

That plaintiff shall pay one-half (1/2) of the

day

care expense incurred for benefit of the parties' minor child

and

defendant shall provide written

documentation of the monthly child

care expense.
8.

Plaintiff to pay all reasonable expenses defendant

may incur for books and tuition at Weber State University as she is
pursuing
sophomore

a

bachelor's

degree.

Defendant

is

approximately

in college and plaintiff's obligation

a

to pay for her

books and tuition shall not extend beyond four years from June 1,
1991.
9.

That the family home and real property located at 703

W. 650 N., Clearfield,
received

Utah

has been

sold

and

one-half the net sales proceeds, and

each party

has

if there are any

additional payments received for payment of the reserve account,
each party shall also divide the same equally.
10.

That defendant shall be awarded the 1987 Jeep

STIPULATION
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Cherokee, her IRA and her retirement at Hill Air Force Base and
one-half the net sales proceeds from the sale of the home.
11.

That

retirement, his

defendant

interest

shall

in Alpine

be

awarded

Paving,

his

Inc., his

IRA, his
camping

equipment, fishing boat and camping trailer, and one-half the net
sale proceeds from the sale of the home.
12.

The parties shall divide equally the joint account

at Shear son Leheman.
13.

That defendant shall be paid $7,825.00 on or before

January 31, 1993 as reimbursement of one-half the parties prior
investment in Alpine Paving, Inc.
14.
household
neither

That

furniture

the
and

parties

have

furnishings

party makes any claim

upon

and

equitably
personal

the other

for

divided

the

effects, and
any item of

personal property.
15.

That

plaintiff

shall maintain

a life

insurance

policy in the sum of $50f000.00 and defendant shall maintain a life
insurance in the sum of $10,000.00 and each party shall designate
their minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as beneficiary thereto and
each shall maintain said child as beneficiary until she reaches at
least 18 years of age.
16.

That plaintiff may be allowed to claim the parties1

minor child, Stephanie Krambule, as a dependent for purposes of

STIPULATION
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computation of his Federal and State Income Taxes if he is current
on his child support and he pays any monetary loss defendant may
incur by reason of not being
dependent for tax purposes.

allowed

to claim said

child as a

Plaintiff shall pay defendant in cash

for any loss she may incur prior to defendant signing any forms
necessary for plaintiff to claim the parties' child as a dependent
for tax purposes. Defendant to furnish plaintiff all necessary tax
information no later than February 28 of each year and pla'intiff to
advise defendant no later than March 30 of each year as to his
election whether to claim the parties' child as a dependent for tax
purposes.
17.

That each party shall pay their own attorney fees

and cost of Court ancurred in these proceedings.
18.

That

each party

shall pay one-half

of any non-

covered medical expense incurred during the course of the marriage
and

each

party

shall

be

responsible

to

pay

any

debts

and

obligations they may have incurred since their date of separation
on or about May 3, 1991.
19.

That plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all

business debts incurred in connection with Alpine Paving, Inc. and
shall hold defendant harmless thereon.
20.

In the event defendant decides to move from the

immediate area, she shall notify plaintiff of her intent to
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relocate, and in any event, plaintiff shall receive a minimum of
forty-five (45) days actual notification prior to leaving,
DATED this

/£

day of Q ^ * ^ ,

v

, 1992..

RI CKY D. WRAMBULE
Plaintiff

fOBERT L. NZ^LEY
Attorney for Plaintiff

BARBARA R. KRAWBULE
Defendant
^

Attorney for Defendant
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December 3, 1991

Attorney Robert L. Neeley
2485 Grant Avenue
Ogden, Utah 84401
RE; Krambule vs. Krambule
My File No. 400-11909-V
Dear Robert:
In connection with the above matter, my client has
recently brought to my attention an item that she debated
at great lengths whether she should or should not pursue
and has finally decided she's going to pursue it.
Your client and my client agreed to artificial insemination so that the parties could have another child.
This artificial insemination was in fact conducted
and as a result my client is pregnant and expecting a
child.
She is somewhere between 4 and 6 months pregnant
and since he agreed to the artificial insemination and
she's going to obtain for me his written consent, the
child is his and I've tried this before where the Court
has acknowledged these types of agreements.
My client has indicated that if he will not put up
a fuss over this child, pay the child support in accordance
with the schedule for the children, then she would give up
any claim she has to alimony.
In addition, she indicated that she would allow
overnight visits on Mondays and Wednesdays and when school
is not in session, which would include holidays and summer
vacation.
Please review this with your client, get back with me
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and if we can work out a Stipulation along those lines, let
me know.
The Stipulation you sent me does not provide for that
and my client is not willing to sign it.
I did forward to her a copy, she has it, and that's
what brought this to mind because she does not feel that
this child should be left out and the parties would then
have two children, Stephanie and whatever this child turns
out to be, whether it's a boy or a girl.
Please review this with your client and get back with
me and if we can resolve it great and if not, then let's
get it tried. I don't believe we've had a Pre-trial yet and
if your client is not willing to negotiate this item then
one or both of us should file a request for Pre-trial.
I will await your response. I remain,

PNV:kh
cc: Barbara Krambule

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I placed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Petition for
Writ of Certiorari in the United States mail, postage prepaid, on this 14th day of February,
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ROBERT L. NEELEY
Attorney for Respondent
2485 Grant Avenue, #200
Ogden, UT 84401

